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How essential is trust in science to prevent the spread of COVID-19? Previous2
work shows that people who trust in science are more likely to comply with offi-3
cial guidelines, which suggests that higher levels of compliance could be achieved4
by improving trust in science. However, analysis of a global dataset (n=4341)5
suggests otherwise. Trust in science had a small, indirect effect on adherence6
to the rules. It affected adherence only insofar as it predicted people’s approval7
of prevention measures such as social distancing. Trust in science also medi-8
ated the relationship between political ideology and approval of the measures9
(more conservative people trusted science less and in turn approved of the mea-10
sures less). These effects varied across countries, and were especially different11
in the USA. Overall, these results mean that any increase in trust in science is12
unlikely to yield strong immediate improvements in following COVID-19 rules.13
Nonetheless, given its relationships with both ideology and individuals’ atti-14
tudes to the measures, trust in science may be leveraged to yield longer-term15
and more sustained social benefits.16
During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientists have recommended measures17
such as physical distancing and mask wearing, yet these have been a target of18
controversy. Trust in science correlates with adherence to such guidelines1, as19
does political orientation2. Though conservatives typically trust science less3,4,20
they are more likely to follow COVID-19 rules when they trust it more5. So21
is strengthening trust in science, particularly among conservatives, a good way22
to protect society from the pandemic? We should be cautious, lest claims by23
scientists that science is important seem self-serving. This article examines two24
potential blind spots in the view that strengthening trust in science will improve25
adherence to measures aimed at preventing the spread of the virus.26
First, if science is to play an ethical and robust role in behavioral change27
during the pandemic, science should change minds, not just coerce behavior.28
The literature on trust and persuasion shows that people may follow new norms29
not because they approve of them, but because of fear or propaganda, and these30
coercive effects are typically short-lived6. Thus, one aim is to test whether trust31
in science influences both approval of prevention measures and adherence with32
those measures. Doing so is especially important as approval and adherence are33
distinct mechanisms in the literature on social norm change7, and as people can34
follow COVID-19 rules without necessarily approving of them8.35
Second, science does not operate in a vacuum. Even if people trust science,36
they also trust others in their society, and observe their behavior. People often37
conform to others around them9, and take their main cues on how to behave38
in the COVID-19 pandemic from each other10. Thus, another aim is to test39
whether trust in science still matters for adherence, controlling for this social40
baseline.41
In line with current studies, this article tests whether trust in science will42
positively predict adherence to pandemic social distancing guidelines (Research43
Question 1). However, to better understand the kind of behavioral change44
necessary to beat this pandemic, it also examines whether trust in science acts45
more on minds (‘approval’ of prevention measures) or behavior (‘adherence’46
to the measures), especially once political ideology and social conformity are47
accounted for (Research Question 2). Finally, given that attitudes to COVID-48
19 measures and the effects of ideology on those attitudes vary across countries2,49
we check whether the effects of trust in science are consistent internationally, or50
whether any countries deviate from global patterns in those effects (Research51
Question 3).52
Overview of the present study53
As part of a larger project on the normative and social aspects of COVID-1910,54
participants in an online global survey rated their trust in science and political55
ideology. To capture whether science affects minds and behavior, participants56
rated how much they approved of and how much they adhered to physical57
distancing measures as implemented in their country of residence the week prior58
to their response. Social conformity was accounted for by asking participants59
how much they thought their close circle followed the same distancing rules.60
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Finally, the global nature of the survey affords exploration of cross-country61
variation in these relationships.62
Results63
Descriptive overview64
Of the 6674 participants who finished the survey, 1577 opted out of the question65
on political ideology and 1199 indicated that they had no close circle (in the66
specific sense of ‘close circle’ as operationalized here: see Methods). This leaves67
4341 completed responses, as 442 had missing data on both counts.68
As an initial check that these gaps not bias our conclusions, there was no69
significant difference in the main outcome variable, adherence to physical dis-70
tancing guidelines, between the 4341 participants who answered all questions71
(mean adherence 63.8%) and the 2333 participants who had some missing data72
(mean adherence 62.9%, less than a one percentage-point difference, regression73
b = 0.89, SE = 0.55, t = 1.9, p = .11). We explore the effects of missing data74
in more detail at https://osf.io/s5mdh/.75
The final sample included 1293 men, 2985 women, 39 non-binary people,76
and 24 who chose not to answer the gender question. Mean age was 37.677
years (SD=14.5). Mean education was 3.28 on a five-point scale (from 0=‘No78
schooling completed’ to 5=‘Postgraduate degree’). The point nearest the mean79
(point 3) corresponds to ‘University undergraduate degree/professional equiva-80
lent’. These demographic variables were included as covariates in all analyses81
reported below (full details are available at https://osf.io/s5mdh/).82
Does trust in science predict unique variance in adherence83
behavior?84
The pre-registered hypothesis was that trust in science would predict adherence85
to physical distancing rules. However, given recent findings10 that two strong86
predictors of adherence are approval of the rules and social conformity (i.e.,87
one’s close circle’s adherence to the rules), it is important also to check whether88
trust in science still predicts unique variance in adherence behavior when these89
other factors are accounted for.90
Fig. 1 shows coefficients from four Bayesian linear models where adherence91
was regressed on trust in science, or trust in science and various combinations of92
conformity and approval. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with93
95% Credibility Intervals (CIs), as well as Bayes Factors (BFs) where we want94
to assess the evidence in favor of there being no relationship. These models in-95
cluded country as a random effect (see https://osf.io/s5mdh/ for random effects96
structures, model priors, calculation of Bayes Factors, and control variables age,97
gender and education).98
The effect of trust in science on adherence behavior varied, depending on99
which covariates were included. When trust in science was the only predic-100
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tor, it predicted adherence (β = 0.08 [0.06, 0.11]). When social conformity101
was included, the effect of science was reduced (β = 0.06 [0.03, 0.09]). When102
approval of COVID-19 measures was included, the effect of science dropped103
out completely (with just approval as co-variate, trust in science β = 0.02104
[−0.01, 0.04], BF01 = 34; with approval and conformity as co-variates, science105
β = 0 [−0.03, 0.02], BF01 = 70.6).106
At best, trust in science had a small role in predicting adherence. At worst, it107
had no effect whatsoever. Considering direct predictors of adherence, then, it is108
inadvisable to place too much weight on people’s trust in science, independently109
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Figure 1: Standardized linear regression betas with 95% Credible Intervals (CIs)
for the effects of trust in science, individual approval, and social conformity on
adherence behavior, according to which predictors were included in each model.
Does trust in science predict approval of the rules?111
A second aim was to see whether trust in science predicts approval of the rules,112
adherence to the rules, or both. This aim can be addressed with a path analysis,113
comprising simultaneous Bayesian linear regressions. In addition to pathways114
from trust in science to approval and adherence, the model included pathways to115
adherence from the aforementioned predictors (approval and social conformity).116
Furthermore, as previous research has shown that political ideology predicts117
trust in science3,4 and adherence to COVID-19 rules2, and that trust in science118
may mediate the latter relationship5, additional pathways for these relationships119
were included. All pathways include random intercepts for country (though see120
Fig. 3 below for additional random slopes). See https://osf.io/s5mdh/ for fur-121
ther details, including demographic control variables age, gender and education.122
The model pathways are illustrated in Fig. 2a. Fig. 2b plots standardized regres-123
sion coefficients and CIs for the fixed effects. The model R2 for adherence was124
0.31 [0.29, 0.33].125
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As expected, a more conservative ideology predicted lower trust in science126
(β = −0.23 [−0.29,−0.17]). There was no direct effect of trust in science on ad-127
herence (β = 0 [−0.06, 0.07], BF01 = 33.45). However, trust in science predicted128
approval (β = 0.25 [0.19, 0.33]), and had an indirect effect on adherence, medi-129
ated by approval (β = 0.08 [0.06, 0.11]). Thus, trust in science had a moderate130
effect on whether people think they should adhere, but only a small, indirect131
effect on adherence behavior.132
Ideology had no direct effect on approval (β = 0.01 [−0.04, 0.06], BF01 =133
38), though it indirectly affected approval, mediated by trust in science (β =134
−0.06 [−0.08,−0.04]). Ideology had no direct effect on adherence (β = −0.04135
[−0.09, 0.01], BF01 = 13.35), but had an indirect effect via the science—approval136


































Figure 2: Pathways and posterior samples for path analysis. (a) Model pathway
standardized betas, including 95% CIs for the direct and total effects of science
and ideology. (b) Posterior samples for model fixed effects, with whiskers show-
ing 89% (thick) and 95% (thin) CIs.
We have structured the above path model based on findings in the literature138
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(e.g., that ideology predicts trust in science3) and domain knowledge (e.g., as139
trust in science is a relatively stable trait11 that predates the pandemic, it140
is more plausible that the arrows point from trust in science to approval of141
pandemic measures than the other way around). We stress that we do not142
claim this as evidence that these are causal effects. We do, however, show that143
the same conclusions about the role of trust in science do not depend on this144
specific model structure (https://osf.io/s5mdh/).145
How do the key relationships vary across countries?146
Given cross-country variation in the role of political polarization in COVID-19147
pandemic2 and trust in science12, it is important to check whether there is148
consistency in the core relationships involving political ideology and trust in149
science identified above.150
For this reason, the model represented in Fig. 2a included by-country random151
slopes for the pathway from ideology to trust in science, and for the pathway152
from trust in science to approval of COVID-19 measures. The variation in these153
relationships can be explored using the posterior samples for the random slopes154
(here, for the top-10 participating counties by sample size). Fig. 3 plots these155
posterior samples.156
Despite some between-country variation, the effects of ideology on trust in157
science (Fig. 3a) and of science on approval (Fig. 3b) were consistently in the158
same direction (relative to 0, shown with a dotted red line).159
However, compared to population-level effects, in the USA, conservative ide-160
ology was more negatively linked to trust in science (consistent with previous161
findings2), and trust in science was more positively linked to people’s approval162
of COVID-19 measures. Italy showed a similar, though weaker, pattern as the163
USA, whereas other countries were less consistent. For instance, Turkey had a164
fairly typical relationship between ideology and science, whereas the relationship165
betwee trust in science and approval was weak.166
Supplementary analyses167
In the supporting material at https://osf.io/s5mdh/, we check that our find-168
ings do not depend on narrow assumptions. In particular, we discuss: imputed169
missing data, simulation of potential unmeasured confounds, generalized lin-170
ear regressions (e.g., a zero one inflated beta regression), and alternative path171
models (e.g., where conformity is not just a covariate, separate from the other172
predictors).173
Our claims about the role of trust in science are robust against all of these174
alternative analysis strategies. The only conclusion which changes slightly is175
that there is sometimes evidence for a direct effect of ideology on adherence,176
depending on such modeling decisions. However, as our focus here is on trust177
in science rather than ideology, we simply conclude that there might be a di-178































Figure 3: Posterior samples for random slopes for the top 10 countries by sample
size. Samples for (a) random slopes for the effect of ideology on trust in science,
and (b) for trust in science on individual approval. Fixed effects shown with
dashed blue lines and 0 shown with dotted red lines. (AUS: Australia; BGD:
Bangladesh; DEU: Germany; FRA: France; GBR: United Kingdom; ITA: Italy;
PER: Peru; SWE: Sweden; TUR: Turkey; USA: United States of America).
Discussion181
Trust in science is a topical research area and a praiseworthy end. But what182
difference does trust in science really make, when it comes to the adoption of183
new norms, such as those required in a pandemic? Two potential blindspots are184
whether trust in science makes a difference both to what people do and what185
they think, and whether it makes a difference over-and-above known effects of186
social influence.187
The results of this study deliver a somewhat mixed verdict. On an opti-188
mistic note, trust in science changes minds, so its role in the pandemic is unlike189
those of propaganda or threat, which focus on forcing behavior6. On a more190
pessimistic note, trust in science only has a small and indirect effect on whether191
people followed distancing guidelines. Thus, improving trust in science is un-192
likely to yield major increases in adherence. To illustrate, suppose that a wildly193
successful messaging campaign leads to a 20% increase in trust in science. Mul-194
tiplying this by the total effect in Fig. 2a, that would only yield a 2% increase195
in adherence.196
Attitudes toward science are part of a complex belief system. In this context,197
our results show that trust in science appears to be a linchpin linking politi-198
cal ideology to approval of distancing guidelines. Previous research on climate199
change denial has shown that pro-science recommendations are more effective200
when they appeal to people’s values and when they are consistent with their201
ideology13,14. The findings here raise the possibility that the same could be202
done for behavioral changes required by the health crisis.203
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Trust in science generates other epistemic benefits: It makes people less sus-204
ceptible to misinformation15 and influences the formation of opinion-networks16.205
It is a relatively stable trait11, and is resistant to erosion from ideological oppo-206
nents17. In that sense, these findings may be helpful for policy-based interven-207
tions as they suggest that trust in science could serve as a ‘boost’ for behavioral208
change. Unlike ‘nudges’ that focus on behavior and are usually easily reversible,209
‘boosts’ focus on people’s decision-making processes and can therefore achieve210
sustained behavioral change18.211
One limitation is that our social-media recruitment process did not produce212
a representative sample. Specifically, there was a high proportion of educated213
women (see ‘Descriptive overview’ in Results). However, the size and global214
nature of the sample — which were only achieved thanks to these recruitment215
methods — afford epistemic benefits that counterbalance the limitations of non-216
representativeness. Further, all analyses included demographic variables (such217
as age, gender and education) as covariates, and included country as a random218
effect.219
Apart from these statistical considerations, one indication that our recruit-220
ment procedure has not seriously biased results is that the levels of the main221
phenomenon of interest — trust in science — are strikingly similar to levels in222
previous studies. The average level of trust in science reported here — measured223
on a percentage scale with three items — was 75.6% (SD=20). This compares224
with levels previously reported during the pandemic, such as 82% (4.12 on a225
5-point scale, using 14 items, with a sample recruited via social media5), 77%226
(5.39 on a 7-point scale, using just two items drawn from the same instrument227
used here, with a representative sample of New Zealanders19), or 76% (3.81 on228
a 5-point scale, using a 21 items, with a sample of US residents recruited via229
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk11). As these studies varied in the number of items230
(ranging from 2 to 21) and in their recruitment strategy and representativeness,231
this suggests that measurement of trust in science is somewhat robust to such232
differences.233
Another limitation is that we considered only one behavior — social dis-234
tancing — as it was the dominant concern at the time of data collection. It is235
an important avenue for future research to see how these findings generalize to236
mask wearing and vaccination uptake.237
In sum, trust in science has the potential to promote sustainable social good.238
In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, we show what the mechanisms and239
limits of trust in science can be for achieving behavioral change. Its role is240
limited to an extent, in that it does not have a direct effect on adherence to241
social distancing guidelines and in that its indirect effect on these (via approval242
of policy) is too small to make much difference. On the other hand, its role is243
central to the ecology of values and beliefs that govern human behavior in a244
pandemic, as it is the pivotal link between political ideology and attitudes to245
pandemic-prevention measures.246
Even if trust in science has little effect on short-term behavior, as the focus247
of guidelines shifts from distancing and masks to vaccines, trust in science may248
be a vital part of decision making in the face of such volatility. Our study shows249
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that science performs best, not at changing behavior, but at convincing minds.250
Methods251
Participants252
Participants were recruited via social media, university mailing lists, press re-253
leases and blog posts. Participation was not compensated. Overall, 6674 par-254
ticipants completed the survey. However, participants were able to opt out255
of certain personal questions (e.g., on political ideology). Further, the opera-256
tionalization of “close social circle” (see below) meant that some participants257
responded that they had no close circle, in which case there is no data for258
whether they thought their close circle was adhering to COVID-19 measures259
(our social conformity measure). These two sources of missing data mean that260
there are 4341 complete responses for the variables reported here.261
Participants’ countries of residence with samples larger than 100 were: UK262
(1612); Turkey (630); USA (459); Peru (216); Germany (189); France (188);263
and Australia (109). For further details about recruitment and demographics,264
see ref10.265
The study received ethical approval through the University of Nottingham,266
and all participants provided informed consent. Data was not retained from any267
surveys that were abandoned before the final debrief.268
Procedure269
The survey was delivered via a custom web app (desktop and mobile) written270
in jsPsych20. A link to a full demonstration of this app can be found in the271
wiki at https://osf.io/ke5yn/.272
Participants first selected which language they would like to do the survey273
in (options: Arabic, Bangla, Chinese, English, Farsi, French, German, Hindi,274
Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish).275
After providing informed consent, participants indicated their close social276
circle using an established method21. First, participants listed the first names277
of all those people with whom they had had a conversation with in the previous278
7 days (these names are not retained in the data). Second, those names were279
presented on the screen, and participants selected which names (if any) they280
would turn to for comfort or advice, using checkboxes. Their close social circle281
is operationalized as the subset of names that they selected at this second stage.282
Participants were reminded of the general guidelines at the time (April–May,283
2020): to keep physical distance from others. They used sliders to respond284
whether they were adhering to this advice (labels 0=‘Not been following the285
advice at all’; 50=‘Been following the advice exactly’; 100=‘Been doing more286
than what is advised’), and show their approval of the guideline (0=‘Not follow-287
ing the advice is completely ok’; 100=‘Not following the advice is completely288
wrong’). They were reminded of the names of those in their close social circle,289
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and responded whether they thought their close social circle was adhering with290
the same guidelines (using the same slider response format).291
Three items were selected from the six-item Credibility of Science scale22292
for reasons of brevity, given the length and voluntary nature of the study. This293
compares with a previous study with a smaller sample size19 that used two294
items from this scale. The items used here were:295
1. People trust scientists a lot more than they should296
2. A lot of scientific theories are dead wrong297
3. Our society places too much emphasis on science298
Participants rated their agreement with these statements using a slider299
(0=‘completely disagree’; 100=‘completely agree’). The ‘trust in science’ score300
is the average of these three responses (reliability23 ωt = 0.75).301
Participants described their political ideology, again using a slider (0=‘very302
liberal’; 100=‘very conservative’). They could opt out in two ways, with one303
checkbox indicating that this continuum did not describe their beliefs, and an-304
other checkbox indicating that they did not wish to respond.305
Finally, participants provided demographic information, including age, gen-306
der and education level (which are included as control variables in all models307
reported here). For other questions asked in the survey as part of the larger308
project on the normative and social aspects of COVID-19, see ref10.309
Open materials, data and analyses310
The Open Science Framework (OSF) repository for the broader project (https://osf.io/311
ke5yn/) includes an interactive demonstration of the full study. The OSF repos-312
itory for this specific study (https://osf.io/s5mdh/) contains the data and anal-313
yses.314
The survey design was preregistered at the above project repository. The315
same registration included the hypothesis that adherence to official guidelines316
would be predicted by trust in science. For other hypotheses in the broader317
project, see ref10.318
The Bayesian models reported below were not pre-registered, but the full319
R analysis script is available at the above study repository. This includes full320
details of model priors, random effects structures, and control variables such as321
gender, age and education.322
Acknowledgements323
JS and OD gratefully acknowledge support by the NOMIS Foundation through324
the project “Diversity in Social Environments”. GD is funded by CAP2025325
Challenge 4. MEZ is funded by the Wellcome Trust grant number 204702. MN326
is funded by a UKRI Future Leader’s Fellowship grant (MR/T041099/1).327
9
Contributions328
JS: conceptualization, methodology, investigation, data curation, analysis, vi-329
sualization, software, writing - original draft, writing - review & editing; OD:330
conceptualization, methodology, investigation, writing - review & editing; fund-331
ing acquisition; GD: conceptualization, investigation, writing - review & edit-332
ing; MN: investigation, writing - review & editing; YZ: data curation, analysis,333
writing - review & editing; MEZ: conceptualization, methodology, investiga-334
tion, writing - original draft, writing - review & editing; BT: conceptualization,335
methodology, investigation, data curation, analysis, writing - review & editing,336
project administration.337
References338
[1] Pagliaro, S. et al. Trust predicts covid-19 prescribed and discretionary339
behavioral intentions in 23 countries. PloS One 16, e0248334 (2021).340
[2] Pennycook, G., McPhetres, J., Bago, B. & Rand, D. Predictors of attitudes341
and misperceptions about COVID-19 in Canada, the UK, and the USA342
(2020).343
[3] Gauchat, G. Politicization of science in the public sphere: A study of public344
trust in the united states, 1974 to 2010. American sociological review 77,345
167–187 (2012).346
[4] Rutjens, B. T., Sutton, R. M. & van der Lee, R. Not all skepticism is equal:347
Exploring the ideological antecedents of science acceptance and rejection.348
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 44, 384–405 (2018).349
[5] Plohl, N. & Musil, B. Modeling compliance with COVID-19 prevention350
guidelines: The critical role of trust in science. Psychology, Health &351
Medicine 26, 1–12 (2021).352
[6] Mercier, H. How gullible are we? A review of the evidence from psychology353
and social science. Review of General Psychology 21, 103–122 (2017).354
[7] Bicchieri, C. Norms in the wild: How to diagnose, measure, and change355
social norms (Oxford University Press, 2016).356
[8] Betsch, C. et al. Social and behavioral consequences of mask policies during357
the covid-19 pandemic. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences358
117, 21851–21853 (2020).359
[9] Cialdini, R. B. & Goldstein, N. J. Social influence: Compliance and con-360
formity. Annual Review of Psychology 55, 591–621 (2004).361
[10] Tuncgenc, B. et al. We distance most when we believe our social circle362
does. British Journal of Psychology (2021).363
10
[11] Agley, J. Assessing changes in US public trust in science amid the COVID-364
19 pandemic. Public Health (2020).365
[12] Czarnek, G., Kossowska, M. & Szwed, P. Right-wing ideology reduces the366
effects of education on climate change beliefs in more developed countries.367
Nature Climate Change 11, 9–13 (2021).368
[13] Wolsko, C., Ariceaga, H. & Seiden, J. Red, white, and blue enough to369
be green: Effects of moral framing on climate change attitudes and con-370
servation behaviors. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 65, 7–19371
(2016).372
[14] Dixon, G., Hmielowski, J. & Ma, Y. Improving climate change acceptance373
among us conservatives through value-based message targeting. Science374
Communication 39, 520–534 (2017).375
[15] Roozenbeek, J. et al. Susceptibility to misinformation about COVID-19376
around the world. Royal Society Open Science 7, 201199 (2020).377
[16] Maher, P. J., MacCarron, P. & Quayle, M. Mapping public health responses378
with attitude networks: the emergence of opinion-based groups in the UK’s379
early COVID-19 response phase. British Journal of Social Psychology 59,380
641–652 (2020).381
[17] Kreps, S. & Kriner, D. Model uncertainty, political contestation, and public382
trust in science: Evidence from the COVID-19 pandemic. Science advances383
eabd4563 (2020).384
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